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Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report published 13/09/2024

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry published its second and final report on 4 September.  The report is 7 volumes and 1,700 pages and sums up the Inquiry's findings as follows:


"We conclude that the fire at Grenfell Tower was the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry to look carefully into the dangers of incorporating combustible materials into the external walls of high-rise residential buildings and to act on the information available to them."

 

The fire killed 72 people in 2017.  The Inquiry's first report found the cladding to have been the "principal" reason for the blaze's rapid spread. Its second report looks at the causes of the fire. It concludes:

 

  • The Government was warned about cladding fires in 1992 when the 11-storey Knowsley Heights tower in Merseyside caught fire. In 1999 there was another fire at Garnock Court in Irvine, North Ayrshire, and a committee of MPs repeated the concerns.  But no action was taken to ban flammable cladding because it had already been classed as meeting a British safety standard.

 

  • Safety tests in 2001 revealed the type of cladding in question "burned violently". The results were kept confidential and the Government did not tighten any rules.  "We do not understand the failure to act on a matter of such importance," the inquiry panel said.

 

  • In 2009, six people died in a fire at Lakanal House, a high-rise in South London. The coroner at their inquests asked for a review of building regulations but, the inquiry found, this was "not treated with any sense of urgency."

 

  • In 2010 the coalition government committed to cut "red tape" it saw as holding back British business. The inquiry found this policy so "dominated" the thinking in government that "even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded."

 

  • The government department responsible for housing was "poorly run" and fire safety had been left in the hands of a relatively junior official. Privatisation of the Building Research Establishment in 1997 exposed it to "unscrupulous product manufacturers."

 

  • The inquiry found there had been "systematic dishonesty" from those who made and sold the cladding. Arconic, a manufacturer, "deliberately concealed" the true extent of the danger of the cladding used to wrap Grenfell Tower as a rain-proof barrier. Fire tests it commissioned showed that the cladding performed poorly. However, this information was not given to the BBA, a British private certification company tasked with keeping the construction industry up to date This "caused BBA to make statements that Arconic knew were 'false and misleading'", the report says.

 

  • Two firms made the insulation behind the cladding panels.  Celotex made "false and misleading claims" about its product being suitable. Kingspan, which made 5% of the insulation, had misled the market by not revealing the limitations of its product.

 

  • Installation of the cladding at Grenfell was poorly managed by contractors and the Royal Borough of Kensington and TMO.

 

  • During installation, there was a failure to establish who was responsible for safety standards - resulting in an "unedifying 'merry-go-round of buck-passing'". Studio E, the architect, Rydon, the principal contractor, and Harley Facades, the cladding sub-contractor, "all took a casual approach to contractual relations. They did not properly understand the nature and scope of the obligations they had undertaken, or, if they did, paid scant attention to them."

 

  • Studio E, the architect, "bears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster" because it had failed to recognise the cladding was combustible.

 

  • Harley Facades "bears significant responsibility" because it had not concerned itself with fire safety at any stage."

 

  • Rydon failed to make clear which contractor was responsible for what - and it failed "to take an active interest in fire safety."

 

  • There was a breakdown in trust and relations between the TMO and residents, which led to a "serious failure to observe responsibilities".  The TMO showed a "persistent indifference" to fire safety and the needs of vulnerable residents.

 

  • The London Fire Brigade had known since the 2009 Lakanal fire that it faced challenges in fighting blazes in high-rise blocks. The firefighters who went into Grenfell had not been prepared for what they would face. Senior officers had been complacent and lacked the skills to recognise the problems and correct them. There was a failure to share knowledge about cladding fires, a failure to plan for a large number of 999 calls, or train staff on what to tell trapped residents.

 

The report concludes with 18 pages of recommendations, covering all aspects of its findings.  In response to the shortcomings of the TMO, it judges the enactment of the Social Housing (Regulation) Act and the implementation of the new regulatory regime to be a sufficient response and does not make any further recommendations.

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